Terrains of Neoliberalism: Constraints and Opportunities for Alternative Models of Service Delivery by Fine, Ben & Hall, David
Part I
Actors, issues and ideologies
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3 Terrains of neoliberalism
Constraints and opportunities for 
alternative models of service delivery
Ben Fine and David Hall
The purpose of this chapter is not so much to demonstrate that neolib-
eralism is suffering some degree of crisis of legitimacy as it is to explain 
why, despite this crisis, the momentum behind alternatives to neoliberalism 
remains so weak. There are good reasons for this, reflecting the extent to 
which neoliberalism is not merely an ideology and a set of policies to be 
reversed but is systemically attached to developments across contemporary 
capitalism over the past 30 years that have been underpinned by, but can-
not be reduced to, what has been termed “financialization”.
We begin by giving an account of financialization – what it is, what are 
its effects and what challenges it poses to alternative policy making. Of 
course, to point to financialization is not to blame finance or the economy 
for all of the world’s woes, even if this is in part an understandable reaction 
to the current crisis. For neoliberalism is not simply confined to economic 
imperatives but has also reflected, for example, responses to the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc, the erosion of the vitality and strength of trade unions and 
liberation struggles, and the perceived failings of the (welfare) state follow-
ing the collapse of the post-war boom.
Financialization has, then, involved the excessive expansion and prolif-
eration of financial markets and their penetration into, and influence over, 
almost every area of economic and social life. But this has occurred against 
a broader and deeper background of changes that have been systemically 
disadvantageous to public sector provision. The systemic hold of neoliber-
alism explains why proposals for public sector alternatives have been so 
thin on the ground and also why those that do prevail against the odds 
should be constrained from meeting wider goals than commercial viabil-
ity. The institutional capacity to deliver public sector alternatives has been 
severely undermined so that even corresponding proposals remain limited, 
let alone delivery in practice.
As will be shown, these observations are borne out in acute form by 
the financial crisis that began in 2008 and the policy responses to it. The 
imperative to rescue the financial system from itself begs the question of 
“rescue it for what and how”, and here there tends to be a yawning gap in 
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real outcomes, especially in public provision, reflecting the extent to which 
policy has been geared towards supporting the private sector in general and 
finance in particular. This leads us to suggest that the building of public 
sector alternatives, on which the vast majority of the poorest in develop-
ing countries will continue to depend for provision of many of their basic 
needs into the foreseeable future, will have to dovetail with the building 
of broader policy initiatives and institutional capacity to deliver them. It 
is not, then, simply a matter of different policies and of a different politics 
that informs them. The most immediate, but far from final, task is one of 
placing finance at the service of delivery rather than the other way about.
But this is much simpler to say than to target and realise in practice as, 
even within the context of the global crisis for which finance is primarily 
responsible, its needs have commanded the deepest and prior claims on both 
resources and policy making. Whereas, for example, the rhetoric of reining in 
the speculation of, and rewards to, the financial system was prominent once 
its crisis broke, there has been an astonishing return to business as usual in 
the widest sense. As the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change finds, 
those UK bodies reporting on the financial system, and how better to regu-
late it, drew upon a membership of “662 years of work experience and 75% 
of those years were spent in City [the London financial centre] occupations 
or servicing City needs” (CRESC 2009, 5). Further, “90% of its witnesses 
came from finance or consultancy with revenue links to finance”.1 Indeed, 
“Membership contained no non-financial businesses and their trade associa-
tions, no trade unions despite the unionisation of retail finance workers, no 
NGOs to represent consumers or press social justice agendas, no mainstream 
economists or heterodox intellectuals, very few politicians or civil servants” 
(CRESC 2009, 23). Significantly, even as witnesses, the representation of the 
public sector was notable for its absence.2
What is both striking and disturbing in these respects is the extent to 
which different constituencies other than those attached to finance have 
been marginalised or subordinated, almost as second nature, within both 
the institutions and processes of government. While CRESC (2009) has at 
least made this transparent in the case of reform and policy making in the 
UK, the dull weight of business as usual – or should that be unusual – is 
liable both to prevail and to go unnoticed in the developing world, with 
at most a necessary deference to more straitened circumstances as global 
recession hits. This is crucial both in understanding the fate of public sector 
alternatives in the past as well as in building their potential for the future. 
For the task is not only to build alternatives based on public sector provi-
sion but also to dig deeper into creating the conditions that allow them to 
emerge and to be sustained and to deliver the goods just as, putatively, neo-
liberalism has previously set about the same task on behalf of the private 
sector and finance with the current devastating results.
Our critical response begins in the third section of the chapter by 
addressing the nature of neoliberalism and how it has systematically, 
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Terrains of neoliberalism 47
through financialization and otherwise, undermined the potential for 
public sector alternatives to emerge and prosper. The fourth section car-
ries this further by reference to empirical developments around “pub-
lic” service delivery and how the private sector has been promoted to be 
involved both directly and indirectly. The last section suggests that secure 
alternatives are only liable to be sustained by subordinating the role of 
finance and paying close attention to sector- and country-specific issues 
of provision within each of health care, water and electricity, for example, 
without neglect of generic issues such as equity, labour market conditions, 
and participatory forms of governance.
FINANCIALIZATION
Financialization is a relatively new term and has its roots primarily in het-
erodox economics and Marxist political economy (Fine 2007, Goldstein 
2009), although it is liable to be increasingly adopted by orthodoxy. It has 
also been understood in a number of different, distinct, but connected and 
overlapping ways. First, at the most casual level, it refers to the astonishing 
expansion and proliferation of financial markets over the past 30 years, 
during which the ratio of global financial assets to global gross domestic 
product (GDP) has risen three times, from 1.5 to 4.5 (Palma 2009).3 That 
this might be indicative of dysfunction – why do you need three times as 
many financial services proportionately to oil the economy than previ-
ously? – has previously been much overlooked precisely because of the 
market success of financialization in terms of growth and rewards. As the 
variously infamous former US Treasury Secretary, chief economist at the 
World Bank, president of Harvard, and then Barack Obama’s chief eco-
nomic adviser Larry Summers has described the Efficient Market Hypoth-
esis (as cited in Davidson 2008, 52; emphasis added):
The ultimate social functions are spreading risks, guiding investment 
of scarce capital, and processing and disseminating the information 
possessed by diverse traders...prices always reflect fundamental val-
ues...The logic of efficient markets is compelling.
The logic today is less compelling, not least to the bankers themselves who 
had previously deployed it to rationalise what is now being revealed to be a 
reality of inefficient, dysfunctional, and parasitical markets, with a rather 
different meaning materialising in the crisis to the notion of “spreading 
risks” than the intended reduction!
Second, financialization has been associated with the expansion of spec-
ulative assets at the expense of mobilising and allocating investment for 
real activity. This is most notable in the ex post recognition of the lax regu-
lation of the financial sector and corresponding calls to put the speculative 
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milch cow back in the barn and reduce the contamination between specula-
tive and real investments. That real investment itself is speculative, being 
contingent upon uncertain future returns, and that competition in financ-
ing depends upon expanding systemic risk by potential contagion at a 
greater rate than individual risk, are not necessarily overlooked. But greater 
restraint is called for between barn and field.
Third, this is because financialization has been understood as both 
the expansion and the proliferation of financial instruments and services. 
These have given birth to a whole range of financial institutions and mar-
kets and corresponding acronyms that are simply bewildering, quite apart 
from futures markets for trading in commodities yet to be produced (for 
which carbon is the most fetishised) and, most infamously of all, sub-prime 
mortgages. The expansion of the latter and their bundling into derivatives 
that were traded on and on ultimately had the effect of triggering the crisis, 
and is indicative of the previous two aspects.
Fourth, at a systemic level, financialization has been located in terms of 
the dominance of finance over industry. Empirically, this is not a matter of 
finance telling industry what to do, as recent trends have witnessed corpora-
tions relying less rather than more upon financial institutions to fund their 
operations as they have been able to raise funds on their own account. Yet, 
especially in the US, even non-financial corporations have necessarily been 
caught up in the process of financialization as they have increasingly derived 
profitability from their financial as opposed to their productive activities. As 
the leading Financial Times journalist Martin Wolf has put it:4
The US itself looks almost like a giant hedge fund. The profits of finan-
cial companies jumped from below 5 per cent of total corporate profits, 
after tax, in 1982 to 41 per cent in 2007.
The corresponding implications for the level, pace and efficacy of pro-
ductive activity have been highlighted by Rossman and Greenfield from a 
labour movement perspective:
What is new is the drive for profit through the elimination of produc-
tive capacity and employment. . . . This reflects the way in which finan-
cialization has driven the management of non-financial companies to 
‘act more like financial market players’. (2006, 2)
More generally, Stockhammer (2004) has been at the forefront in arguing 
that financialization has been at the expense of real investment.
Fifth, for some, not least as a defining characteristic of neoliberalism 
itself, financialization is perceived to be a strategy for redistributing income 
to a class of rentiers (Palma 2009; but see Lapavitsas 2009 for a contrary 
view). Certainly, the rewards to finance systemically and individually have 
been astonishing not least, once more, in the US, where real incomes for the 
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vast majority of the population have stagnated over the last 30 years and 
any productivity gains have accrued to the top 1% of earners whose share 
in GDP had risen from less than 10% to more than double this.
Sixth, though again with the US in the lead, consumption has been sus-
tained by the extension of (consumer) credit, not least through the use of 
capital gains in housing as collateral. For some, this has been part and parcel 
of the leading role played by financialization in exploiting workers through 
provision of financial services at abnormally high levels of banking profits 
(dos Santos 2009, Lapavitsas 2009; but see Fine 2009d, 2010 for a critique). 
This is, however, a single element in the much broader system of financial 
arrangements at the global level that has witnessed huge balance of trade and 
payments deficits for the US, matched by a corresponding holding of US dol-
lars as reserves by other countries (with dramatic increases for China in par-
ticular). This is a consequence of neoliberal policies to relax if not eliminate 
exchange controls, opening economies to vulnerability to capital movements 
and, thereby, requiring high levels of reserves as a safeguard. The paradox is 
that with all its deficits and minimal interest rates, the US dollar has not suf-
fered a collapse despite failing to follow the neoliberal policy advice on such 
matters that it has sought to impose on other countries through the World 
Bank and IMF when similarly inflicted by deficits of lesser magnitudes. Pre-
vious crises elsewhere have been used to facilitate financialization by opening 
up financial markets to international, and especially US, participation.
However the term financialization is defined and used, it points to a com-
plex amalgam of developments within global finance and in its interactions 
with, and consequences for, economic and social life more generally. For 
further, seventh, it is not merely the expansion and proliferation of (specu-
lative) financial markets that are striking but also the penetration of such 
financing into a widening range of both economic and social reproduction: 
housing, pensions, health, and so on. This is, of course, of paramount sig-
nificance for social and economic infrastructure and for the displacement 
of public by private sector provision, most notably in case of privatisation, 
which can lead to proliferation of financial assets and consultancies.
Thus, different approaches and contributions to financialization may 
offer different emphases, but there is equally a need to locate it within a 
theory of finance itself. For this, there are as many competing candidates 
as there are forms of finance, ranging from the now discredited efficient 
market hypothesis to analyses of systemic financial fragility (most closely 
associated with economist Hyman Minsky). It is not possible to appraise 
these here and offer a synthesis other than in the form of a number of con-
clusions – namely, that financialization:
•	 reduces overall levels and efficacy of real investment as financial 
instruments and activities expand at its expense even if excessive 
investment does take place in particular sectors at particular times 
(as with the dotcom bubble of a decade ago);
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•	 prioritises shareholder value, or financial worth, over other economic 
and social values;
•	 pushes policies towards conservatism and commercialisation in all 
respects;
•	 extends influence more broadly, both directly and indirectly, over eco-
nomic and social policy;
•	 places more aspects of economic and social life at the risk of volatil-
ity from financial instability and, conversely, places the economy and 
social life at risk of crisis from triggers within particular markets (as 
with the food and energy crises that preceded the financial crisis).
Although financialization is a single word, it is attached to different forms 
and effects of finance. The discussion here has drawn much of its illustra-
tion from the US and the UK, and these have been in the forefront of finan-
cialization. Different countries have experienced financialization differently, 
and this is especially true of the developing world. It has, for example, been 
much less affected by international transmission mechanisms associated with 
toxic financial assets than through the slowdown in growth, correspond-
ing export demand, and capital flows from direct foreign investment, aid, 
and migrant remittances. Nonetheless, financialization has been important 
in the developing world, with corresponding diversity of impacts on the way 
in which and the extent to which financial interests have been formed and 
have influenced policy. This has been especially important for social policy 
and provision of economic and social infrastructure generally conceived, not 
least through the influence of donor agencies. So, if financialization lies at the 
heart of neoliberalism, itself in crisis, what are future prospects?
NEOLIBERALISM IS DEAD? LONG LIVE ...
A striking feature of the current global crisis is the speed and depth with 
which the legitimacy of neoliberalism has been discredited. While the last 
recession on this scale, following the collapse of the post-World War II boom, 
also witnessed the loss of its ideological underpinnings – those of Keynesian-
ism – it did so much more slowly. Keynesianism itself only emerged over a 
decade or more in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, with a 
world war intervening before it was established as the new conventional wis-
dom before its own demise. The monetarist counter-revolution that replaced 
it and initiated the era of neoliberalism also took a decade to take hold, from 
the early 1970s. Today, though, the erstwhile pedlars of Tina (“there is no 
alternative” to neoliberalism) are understandably thin on the ground in the 
wake of the extraordinarily acute and systemic failure of what is the perfect 
market, or markets, those attached to finance.
To point to the crisis of neoliberalism does not in itself offer alternatives, 
and these also seem to be thin on the ground apart from the ad hoc appeals 
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for stronger regulation of financial markets and particular Keynesian meas-
ures of demand management to temper the worst fallout from the credit 
crunch. We return to alternatives later but first consider the ideology of 
neoliberalism beyond the simple nostrum of leaving as much as possible to 
what are presumed to be the efficient workings of markets. For the ideol-
ogy runs much deeper than posing the market and the individual against 
the state and officialdom, with the presumption that individuals endlessly 
pursue self-interest – legitimately when done through the market but also 
illegitimately through the state as in rent seeking and corruption. The role 
of the state, therefore, has to be minimised because it provides opportuni-
ties for purely self-seeking actors. This has the effect of disparaging the role 
that can be played by collective action and of denying the possibility of a 
public sector ethos.
Indeed, one of the consequences of neoliberal ideology is to have corrup-
tion defined as something that only takes place within the state. As the Asian 
Development Bank puts it, “The succinct definition [of corruption] utilised 
by the World Bank is ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ ”.5 This 
conveniently excludes the extent to which corruption involves the private sec-
tor as one of its partners in crime. The corporate payer of bribes cannot, on 
this definition, be guilty of corruption – only the public sector receiver of 
the bribe can. And totally excluded are “corrupt” dealings entirely confined 
within the private sector for which the neoliberal expansion of the market 
allows for greater scope and by no means greater transparency.
Nor is neoliberal ideology a simple stance of being pro-market and anti-
state, for it is only able to be so on the basis of gathering mutually inconsist-
ent stances together. This is most apparent in terms of economic analysis, 
for appeal is made to mainstream neoclassical economics for the static effi-
ciency that accrues from perfectly working markets. This depends upon 
taking preferences, resources, and technologies as given, and relying upon 
the market to allocate those resources efficiently to most desirable uses 
in the absence of the distortions and the rent seeking that would derive 
from the interventions of the state (and its self-seeking officials). Irrespec-
tive of the extraordinarily demanding conditions for the market to work 
in this way, even on the theory’s own terms (no externalities, increasing 
returns to scale, oligopolies, etc.), there is an alternative neoliberal ration-
ale for reliance upon the market that is entirely different and incompatible 
with one based on static market efficiency. For the neo-Austrian strand of 
neoliberalism sees the market as the means by which imperfectly informed 
but innovative individuals can best bring about dynamic change, in major 
part relying upon the spontaneous emergence of the necessary institutions 
to support the market in this role (Denis 2004).
Such, in a nutshell, are the neoliberal arguments for laissez-faire, its 
stance on the economy. But the ideology does not rest there because it is 
generally recognised that the economy as market does not work in a vac-
uum and needs the state and other institutions, spontaneous or otherwise, 
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as supports. Where these begin and end remains fuzzy, but the liberal 
veneer associated with the freedom of the individual within the market 
and the antipathy to the state is rapidly abandoned once it comes to the 
state’s essential functions. We should recall that the first major experiment 
with neoliberalism was undertaken by the “Chicago Boys” in Chile in the 
mid-1970s. Not surprisingly then, although democracy is now seen as an 
element of good governance, neoliberalism has previously been associated 
with authoritarianism, conservatism and the limitations on freedoms once 
stepping outside the market. This is especially so in the case of labour 
markets and the antipathy to trade unions although, markedly over the 
more recent period for reasons that will emerge, there is a more ambiguous 
stance on social movements (and civil society). These have the potential to 
be politically conservative, to be market conforming and correcting, and to 
serve as an alternative to campaigning for more and more secure provision 
through the state.
Complementing the ideology of neoliberalism has been an equally 
prominent and familiar set of policies, especially for the developing world, 
associated with the Washington Consensus. These have included both pri-
vatisation and limits on government spending more generally, in deference 
to keeping a tight rein on budget deficits. But over the last decade or more, 
the Washington Consensus has given way to the post-Washington Con-
sensus, which has, at least theoretically and rhetorically, distanced itself 
from neoliberalism. It presents itself as more state-friendly, as rejecting the 
notion that one (free-market) model fits all, and that both market and insti-
tutional imperfections offer a rationale in principle for a role for the state to 
make markets, and globalisation, work better through piecemeal interven-
tion to that end (Fine et al., 2001, Jomo and Fine 2006, Fine 2009b). Yet, 
policy advice, and aid conditionalities in practice, despite the emergence of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Millennium Development Goals, 
have often been criticised for departing very little from those associated 
with the original Washington Consensus. Indeed, the so-called augmented 
Washington Consensus may even be seen to have broadened the imposi-
tion of neoliberal policies, adding more conditionalities to those such as 
free trade, privatisation, deregulation, fiscal austerity, and so on. And, 
further compounding the potential confusion, there is the stance of John 
Williamson (2007), who is universally acknowledged as having originated 
the term Washington Consensus in the late 1980s. He explicitly distances 
it from neoliberalism as such and complains that the differences between 
the Washington Consensus and the post-Washington Consensus have been 
exaggerated by the supporters of the latter to garner higher profiles for 
themselves (see also Marangos 2007).
There is, then, considerable ambiguity if not confusion over exactly what 
constitutes neoliberalism in both ideological and policy terms. This is com-
pounded once it is recognised that policies in practice are highly diverse 
across time, place, and area of application. This is so much so that some 
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commentators have even questioned whether it is appropriate to talk about 
neoliberalism at all, not least because its ideological and policy content have 
been so diverse (Castree 2006 and Ferguson 2007, for example; but see also 
Hart [2002, 2008] for the need to take context into account in unravelling 
rather than rejecting neoliberalism [and globalisation] as macroinfluences).
Such concerns over the conceptual viability of “neoliberalism” are likely 
to have been reinforced by the response to the current crisis. For it broke 
while President George W. Bush was still in office in 2008, and policy took 
the form of immediate and extensive intervention by the US and other states 
to support the financial system, even to the point of taking financial institu-
tions and so-called toxic assets into public ownership. Yet, such measures 
still carried the scent of neoliberalism despite its loss of legitimacy and that 
of the financial system in particular. It was not simply guilt by association 
in that the leading neoliberals, such as Bush, were doing the rescuing, but 
what they were rescuing and have continued to rescue, have been the very 
financial markets and institutions that prided themselves on their efficiency 
and efficacy – until they needed massive state support and received it more 
or less on demand.
This paradox is readily resolved once it is recognised that neoliberalism 
has never, in practice, been about withdrawal or minimising the state’s eco-
nomic role. On the contrary, neoliberalism has concerned state intervention 
to promote private capital. In this, though, it is not distinctive from the role 
of the state in the Keynesian period, where it is as well to remember that 
policy towards state-owned enterprises, for example, was often criticised 
for serving private capital at the expense of public provision. What does 
mark the neoliberal era of the past 40 years is the extent to which the inter-
ests of private capital in general have been identified with, if by no means 
reduced to, those of finance in particular.
Within the literature, this core feature of contemporary capitalism has 
been increasingly acknowledged by reference to the previously discussed 
notion of financialization (without necessarily recognising its connection 
to neoliberalism; Fine 2007). The term has been deployed with a number 
of different meanings but, as indicated, it is most appropriate to be all-
inclusive of these in order to incorporate not only the extraordinary expan-
sion and proliferation of financial markets, derivatives, and instruments 
but also to acknowledge the extent to which these have penetrated into ever 
more areas of economic and social reproduction. At the forefront of these 
developments has been privatisation in all of its forms. The point is not to 
suggest that privatisation has simply been some sort of conspiracy on the 
part of finance to further its interests irrespective of those of others. Rather, 
as finance has increasingly come to the fore, so it has both promoted and 
benefited from privatisation with the additional effect of undermining the 
potential for, and nature of, alternatives.
In short, before addressing this in more detail, it is as well to recognise 
that neoliberalism is characterised by two fundamental aspects. First, it 
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combines a complex, shifting, and generally inconsistent amalgam of ide-
ology, scholarship, and policy in practice. Second, while this is generally 
true of representations of capitalism for other periods, the process of finan-
cialization is what has given the current period of neoliberalism its own 
peculiar character. In addition, neoliberalism can be adjudged to have gone 
through two roughly delineated phases, with the early 1990s as a bound-
ary between them. For the first “shock” phase, the promotion of private 
capital in general and of finance in particular has taken precedence, but it 
neither originated with, nor was confined to, eastern Europe, where it did 
take extreme forms. The second phase, however, has had two aspects. One 
has been to respond to the conflicts and dysfunctions of the first phase but, 
more important, the second has been to sustain the process of financializa-
tion itself with, in a sense, the response to the current crisis expressing this 
in extreme form.
That neoliberalism has gone through two phases of the sort we have 
identified is well illustrated by the World Bank’s shifting position on pri-
vatisation. In the first phase of shock therapy, both rhetoric and policy 
conformed to one another with the explicit aim of promoting as much pri-
vatisation as possible. The virtues of privatisation were lavishly praised, 
with any number of microeconomic and macroeconomic benefits prom-
ised to result. Interestingly, the mainstream scholarship of the time was 
considerably more cautious, emphasising that ownership as such does not 
matter as opposed to conditions of competition and regulation (Fine 1990). 
This was simply ignored and, not least from the privatisation think tank 
run from Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet Office, we were told to “just do 
it”, irrespective of the objections and potential stumbling blocks for which 
abstract theory was demonised. Exactly the same unthinking and dogmatic 
approach was taken by the World Bank.
Over the past decade the World Bank’s position has changed dramati-
cally, although with a significant lag of five or more years on the shift from 
Washington Consensus to post-Washington Consensus. The delay allowed 
as much privatisation to be pushed through as possible after which the 
World Bank has gone through what it itself calls a “rethink”, rejecting 
the idea that one model fits all. Perversely, it has even adopted the earlier 
academic wisdom that privatisation needs to be wedded to closer consid-
eration of regulation and competition and has added consideration of other 
conditions such as sources of finance, customer access and capacity to pay 
for vital services.
In practice, however, this does not represent a “rethink” at all, other 
than as a means to push through more participation of the private sec-
tor and, ultimately, full privatisation itself (where possible, and otherwise 
drawing upon, for the private sector, risk-minimising public-private part-
nerships [PPPs]). For the privatisation programme of the first phase was 
already faltering by the mid-1990s, not entirely delivering on its promises 
in terms of levels of investment and performance. The easy and acceptable 
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privatisations had already been pushed through, whether because of high 
levels of potential profitability or lack of effective popular resistance. The 
new strategy now involves the fuller use of the state’s resources and capaci-
ties to incorporate the role of the private sector where previously it had 
been reluctant to engage. Significantly, the focus of World Bank strategy 
has been to shift aid for social and economic infrastructure from state to 
private or PPP provision, with a pecking order of telecommunications, 
energy, transport, and water as privatisation and private sector participa-
tion becomes harder to achieve. In other words, the rethink is concerned 
to push the state even further in favouring the private sector because of the 
latter’s failure otherwise to provide. While, especially for water, state provi-
sion remains the predominant source for an overwhelming majority of the 
population, policy continues to be directed at supporting the private sector, 
or preparing the public sector for it as much as possible through commer-
cialisation/corporatisation and otherwise holding back the extension of the 
public sector.
NEOLIBERALISM IN ACTION
By specifying the nature of neoliberalism, a stronger perspective can be 
taken on policy in terms of what has materialised in the past and what are 
the prospects for the future. First and foremost, it should be emphasised 
that much more is involved than simply reversing the ideologies and policies 
of neoliberalism as if it were a tap that can be turned on and off. For the 
thrust of our analysis, now made explicit, is to suggest that neoliberalism 
goes far beyond ideology and policy insofar as neoliberalism is systemically 
rooted in contemporary capitalism as a whole in the age of globalisation 
with financialization to the fore.
This has had profoundly negative implications for the extent to which 
we are able to draw upon recent experience for alternative models of pub-
lic provision as ideal types since these have been crowded out and under-
mined. One useful way of recognising this is in terms of the momentum 
behind what has been called the “evaluatory trap” associated with priva-
tisation and the commercialised forms of new public sector management 
more generally (Olson et al., 2001). Essentially, following upon privatisa-
tion, it is found that outcomes are not as promised for investment levels, 
quality and access of service, and so on. This then places demands upon 
the state to regulate, make amends for those excluded from creaming off of 
most profitable delivery, renegotiate and monitor contracts, etc..
Here, there are three important points. First, if costs and benefits of such 
outcomes had been known and fully assessed in advance, the privatisation 
would not have been seen to be so attractive and might not have been under-
taken (as might now be anticipated in retrospect, on a grander scale, the 
extent to which finance has been deregulated). Second, the burdens upon the 
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state to make privatisation a success are far from negligible. It is not simply 
a matter of handing everything over to the “free” market. This too is costly, 
not least in use of the state’s resources and capabilities. Indeed, to regulate 
the private sector sufficiently and successfully may involve greater demands 
than the state running things itself as wider goals and objectives are always 
resisted or being undermined by the pursuit of private profit. Third, also 
required is a qualitative shift in the nature and capabilities of the state itself 
as it has become increasingly oriented towards regulating and promoting the 
private sector as opposed to serving public provision.
This can be seen in the development of policies in support of PPPs since 
2008. The central rationale for PPPs is that they provide direct investment 
by the private sector as an alternative to public finance, thus reducing the 
need for public finance through increased government debt. The most fun-
damental problem with PPPs, or any form of privatisation, is that even 
in good times it is a more expensive way of financing capital than state 
borrowing (IMF 2004, OECD 2008). This extra cost is then carried by 
the state, which is the ultimate customer for public service PPPs such as 
hospitals or schools, or by users where the PPP is based on charges, such 
as toll roads or public transport, or some forms of water concessions. The 
state can manage this cost by providing guarantees of various kinds for the 
private loans, but at the expense of undermining the rationale: the “pri-
vate” finance becomes in effect a public liability, which is why statisticians 
have begun insisting in the UK and elsewhere that PPPs should appear on 
government balance sheets (KPMG 2009).
The financial crisis has exacerbated this fundamental problem because 
the gap between interest rates paid by the private and public sector has wid-
ened, as companies have become unable to raise finance, thus increasing the 
relative costs of PPPs further. For existing PPPs needing to refinance their 
business, the problem has been even sharper. The response in a number of 
countries, including the UK, France, and India, has been to create special 
state financial agencies, which in effect borrow as the state and then lend it 
to private companies in PPPs. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
has created a similar “infrastructure crisis fund”, aiming to use $1.2–$10 
billion of public finance from the IFC itself and donors (Hall 2009). These 
measures have been generally derided as an implausible attempt to main-
tain the fiction that the finance is raised by the private entities themselves.
The state/public sector, national and international, now provides layers 
of guarantees for companies, and the burden of these guarantees is often 
effectively transferred to governments of developing countries. If a project 
is partly financed by the IFC, it gains a much better credit rating for the 
whole project because the IFC is in practice a “preferred creditor”, which 
always gets repaid (Bayliss 2009). The Multilateral Investment Guaran-
tee Agency (MIGA) – a World Bank division – is dedicated to providing 
insurance for political risk, and when the now discredited Enron claimed 
successfully in respect of a power station project in Indonesia, abandoned 
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after the dictatorship of Suharto was overthrown, MIGA insisted that the 
Indonesian government reimburse the entire amount. Export credits pro-
vided by northern countries to companies selling to developing countries 
have a similar effect. The loans are structured so that the company is paid 
upfront, and then the government of the importing state is liable for repay-
ing the debt (Greenhill and Pettifor 2002).
The donor countries also use some of their aid budgets to finance pri-
vate sector activity in developing countries. This is done partly through 
funds which are dedicated to support private companies, such as Sweden’s 
Swedfund International AB, France’s Société de Promotion et de Participa-
tion pour la Coopération Économique (PROPARCO), and the Netherlands 
Development Finance Company (FMO), following the same principle as 
the IFC. The sectors covered include the full range of production indus-
tries, but the funds also support private activity in sectors such as tele-
coms, energy, health care, higher education, and waste management. They 
can be described as donor-state-owned private equity funds. At the end of 
2007, these private equity funds of European donors stood at €15.1 billion, 
invested in 3 385 projects.6 These funds could not invest in any project or 
service run directly by public authorities because they are only allowed to 
be invested in commercially viable operations involving a private company. 
As Swedfund states, “Our decisions regarding investments are based solely 
on business principles.” 7 Returns to private investors become the criterion 
of success. The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), the UK 
government’s private investment fund, more than doubled the value of its 
assets between 2004 and 2008 to a total of £2.7 billion, of which £1.4 bil-
lion remained in cash in the UK, and increased its chief executive’s salary 
to £970 000 per year. This was regarded as a developmental success story: 
for the UK government, “financial performance is the principal indicator of 
CDC’s development impact”.8
International and national development banks have also adopted the 
role of “financier of last resort” for private ventures. When multinational 
corporation Bechtel insisted on leaving a water concession in Estonia, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) stepped in to 
buy 25% of the equity, as a kind of “default private owner”; as PPPs became 
harder to finance in Europe in 2009, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
agreed to finance over 50% of some schemes. The same role can be seen at 
the national level: in Brazil, for example, the national development bank, 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) was 
used to co-finance many of the privatisations of the 1990s as a partner to 
private companies. Following the election of the Lula government in 2002, 
BNDES was later used as a way of buying stakes in the same companies 
from multinationals as they left the projects.
Governments also provide implicit or explicit guarantees as purchasers, 
underpinning the returns on many forms of privatisation. For example, 
power purchase agreements with private electricity generators will pledge 
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that state-owned distributors will buy output under “take-or-pay” deals 
for periods of 20–30 years; water treatment plants are built under similar 
contractual terms of long-term purchases at prices that guarantee returns; 
hospitals, schools, and sometimes roads may all rely on similar government 
spending guarantees.
Regulatory systems often have the effect of providing a virtual guaran-
tee of a minimum rate of return, which may be used as an indirect guar-
antee for raising corporate finance. Utilities were able to issue corporate 
bonds even in 2009, unlike most other companies, and were able to issue 
index-linked bonds before the credit crisis, thanks to this implicit guar-
antee underlying regulated industries. French water multinational Suez 
has issued a local bond in Indonesia to refinance its water concession in 
Jakarta, paying off a Euro loan; the Spanish electricity multinationals 
Endesa (now owned by Enel) and Iberdrola both reduced their equity 
stakes in electricity companies in Latin America by issuing bonds and 
raising loans in local currency.
Long-term contractual rights to public spending are typical of PPP and 
PFI (private finance initiative) schemes, with much longer contractual peri-
ods (25–30 years or more) than conventional service contracts (e.g. for 
refuse collection it is three to five years). The effect is thus larger than with 
ordinary outsourcing – switching public spending from direct employment 
to purchasing from a private company. As a result, the public good becomes 
subordinate to the imperatives of designing a commercially viable contract. 
This may involve restructuring of the service itself (e.g. the previously 
national Ghanaian water service was split, to ring-fence the profitable area 
of the capital Accra with the rest of the country served by a separate, finan-
cially disadvantaged, state company [Fuest and Haffner 2007]). In Estonia 
and Italy the basis for assessing the viability of PPPs has been restricted to 
examination of the potential profitability of schemes, with no reference to 
public policy objectives or effective comparison with public sector alterna-
tives (Friedrich and Reiljan 2007, Barretta and Ruggiero 2008).
The effect persists during the long life of PPP contracts. The contrac-
tual obligations render them immune from being cut on policy grounds, 
for example, so that any reductions in public spending fall disproportion-
ately on services provided by staff employed directly by public authori-
ties, because these are not part of a contract with a private company that 
would require compensation if the payments by the public authority were 
reduced. The contracts may even explicitly protect companies against the 
consequences of democracy. Contracts for private road schemes in the 
US, for example, include clauses giving companies “the right to object 
to and receive compensation for legislative, administrative, and judicial 
decisions”. Contracts have become standardised with as much as 70% 
identical content, reflecting the cumulative expertise of corporate law-
yers, whereas the public authorities with which they deal often have little 
or none (Dannin 2009).
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In this light, it is crucial to recognise how significant privatisation is 
for the functioning of the neoliberal state and vice versa, far beyond the 
selling off of state assets, the commercialisation of public services, and the 
deregulation of public and private provision. For every element of policy 
is potentially involved, along the dimensions connecting macro to micro 
as well as more broadly. Macroeconomic policy, for example, has been 
geared towards globalisation of financial markets which have long been 
recognised to press for excessive fiscal restraint, thereby reducing finance 
available for public investment.
One form of financial deregulation has been the relaxation of traditional 
restrictions on pension funds investments. These were typically restricted 
largely to investing in government debt, with extra incentives in the form of 
tax relief for the funds, which had multiple advantages in security and long-
term assets to match their long-term liabilities, while offering the state a 
reliable source of demand for bonds and other government debt. Deregula-
tion meant that funds were able to diversify into national and international 
equity investments, providing extra funds for private capital at the same 
time as governments were reducing their borrowing. One result has been 
that some of the largest pension funds have themselves become leading 
financiers of privatisation in its various forms: in Chile, for example, one-
third of the water companies and a major electricity distribution company 
are now majority-owned by the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP), a 
pension fund covering 284 000 active and retired elementary and second-
ary school teachers in the province of Ontario (Canada),9 and in the UK, 
local government pension funds alone own as much as 3.5% of companies 
whose main business consists of contracted-out public service work, such 
as Serco and Capita.
The privatisation of public sector pension funds is another way in which 
pension contributions, made compulsory by the state, are diverted into pri-
vate hands. Private funds can extract profits through administration fees, 
and invest solely on the basis of maximising returns – by contrast with gov-
ernments, which may use such funds for development purposes. Argentina, 
for example, was persuaded by the IMF in 1994 to reorganise its pensions 
by creating private pension funds to receive and manage the compulsory 
pension contributions, from which the private funds extracted large admin-
istration fees, which rapidly made them unpopular. But this process too is 
contested: in 2008, the government of Argentina renationalised the funds. 
This not only reduced the cost to pensioners of administering the funds, it 
also restored to the government a significant flow of revenue, in the form of 
pension contributions, and ownership of a strategic slice of the economy: 
the pension funds owned 13% of all shares on the stock market.10 Not 
surprisingly, the rush to privatise pensions has now been caught short as 
stock markets have crashed. But the apparently more reasonable line of 
the international financial institutions of now shifting to a more mixed 
system of private, public, and safety nets is more a way of using the state’s 
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resources to restore whatever can be recovered for the private sector from 
the shambles in which it now finds itself (Fine 2009e).
The same neoliberal agenda is reflected in the mistrust of large state-run 
“sovereign wealth funds”, especially those owned and run by governments 
of developing countries, which now have dominant shareholdings in some 
large US and European companies. These were feared to be using their 
power to pursue “political” objectives rather than simple profit maximisa-
tion. This fear was substantially modified during the crisis in 2008 when 
the funds were welcomed for investing in US banks, precisely because of 
the political imperative to rescue the current financial system, with the US 
dollar at its pinnacle as a reserve currency (despite the huge external and 
domestic deficits and minimal interest rates that would have both brought 
down any other currency as well as severe conditionalities in return for the 
support enjoyed by the US).
The interception of state revenues, or compulsory social insurance con-
tributions, is a recurrent theme in the framework of privatisation. Public 
spending, or compulsory private spending, is legitimised as long as it is 
channelled through corporate entities. The US health care insurance com-
panies, for example, lobbied the proposed health reforms by US President 
Barack Obama to insist that contributions required under the proposals 
be paid into a private scheme, not a public sector health insurance scheme. 
Public borrowing for infrastructure investment is seen as irresponsible if it 
takes the form of direct government borrowing and an increased deficit but 
legitimate and welcome when it is channelled through PPPs.
More recently, the crisis has sharply revealed the extent of US inter-
national and domestic indebtedness, the counterpart to which is a corre-
sponding burden carried by developing countries, by no means confined 
to China (Rodrik 2006). Capital accounts have been liberalised so that 
accumulated stocks of dollar reserves have been required to guard against 
short-term capital flight. At the macro level, neoliberalism has also been 
associated with increasing inequality within economies, not least arising 
out of, or trickling down from, the excessive rewards accruing to those 
attached to finance with negative benefits in terms of the mobilisation and 
allocation of resources for investment.
Other areas of policy making, as with industrial and regional policy, 
health, education and welfare, research and development, and skills and 
training, have all been profoundly influenced by neoliberalism, quite apart 
from the pressure for “flexibility” in labour markets, signifying a race to 
the bottom in wages and working conditions. The priority assigned to pri-
vate participation in delivery has squeezed public sector alternatives and 
the rationale for, and capacity to deliver, them. As already suggested, the 
logic and practice is to push for what the private sector can deliver with 
limited regard to broader social and economic objectives or the presump-
tion that these should be picked up by other compensating policy meas-
ures. Whether this ever happens is a moot point as opposed to journeying 
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further down the “evaluatory trap”. There is also significant reliance upon 
devolution and decentralisation with the presumption of greater local and 
democratic participation, whereas this can often turn out to be the passing 
on of responsibility for delivery by an authoritarian central state without 
provision of support for necessary resources.
In short, neoliberalism is not just marked by policy and ideology favour-
ing the private over the public sector, but this has itself been institution-
alised within government capacity itself and the commercial pressures to 
which it responds. And this has been devastating for the potential for for-
mulating and implementing alternative forms of public provision.
This institutionalisation takes a number of forms at global, regional, and 
national levels. At the global level, the key role is played by the World Bank, 
and especially its arm dedicated to financing the private sector, the IFC. 
While the World Bank has included privatisation conditionalities in many 
of its loans over the years, an increasingly high proportion of World Bank 
funds have been channelled through the IFC, effectively tying this flow of 
public money to the private sector. By the end of 2007, the IFC had com-
mitted over $10 billion for this, double the level of just four years earlier 
(Bayliss 2009). A special advisory unit, the Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF) has promoted PPPs globally since 1999. Both 
agencies actively spend money on propaganda activities promoting PPPs: 
for example, the IFC allocated $500 million a year to investing in PPPs in 
India, including $20 million for “advisory services and support staff”.11
The regional development banks, especially the African Development 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have also actively 
promoted various forms of privatisation in their regions; the European 
Commission has promoted PPPs throughout Europe. The institutionali-
sation of corporate interests can be seen even in UN bodies: UNESCO 
receives financing from the leading water multinational, Suez, and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) now plays 
a leading role in promoting privatisation and PPPs across the countries of 
eastern Europe and central Asia (Hall and Hoedeman 2006).
More generally, government and international policy making itself is sub-
ject to institutionalised corporate capture/influence through the extensive 
use of management consultants and business appointees. These consultan-
cies are themselves made up of a small group of multinational firms – such 
as PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst and Young – which act as a 
policy replication mechanism. Another form of this is the appointment of 
increasing numbers of businessmen and women to government policy posi-
tions, which would normally be held by career civil servants. The process 
can also be seen at an international level, most obviously in the collabora-
tion between companies, donors and development banks over privatisations.
The institutionalisation of these relationships can be seen as a general-
ised, if tacit, form of collusion, bordering upon corruption. For these indi-
vidual acts occur as part of a systematic network between political parties 
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and institutions on the one hand, and corporate interests on the other, 
regularly agreeing which policies to adopt, which companies get which 
contracts, and at what price (Della Porta and Vannucci 1999). The proc-
ess includes not only bribes but also legal donations and other networks of 
influence, constituting effective “state capture” (Hellman et al., 2003). The 
operation of conditionalities by the development banks can also be recog-
nised as tantamount to corruption, whereby money – in the form of finance 
for a socially and politically valuable project – is offered in exchange for a 
national government transferring assets and/or contracts to the corporate 
interests in the sector, through privatisation or PPPs.
At the national level, in sectors which are privatised, neoliberal orthodoxy 
insists that regulators must be “independent” of government. Responsibil-
ity for public policy in these sectors is thus transferred from elected minis-
tries to bureaucracies, which are not subject to direct political intervention. 
The UK service regulators, for example, are constitutionally “government 
departments without a minister”, a neat summary of this combination of 
state power without democratic direction.12 Such regulators are then sub-
ject to a well-recognised process of “capture” by the private corporations 
in the sector. This independence does not prevent corporate interests from 
continuing to lobby politicians to overrule inconvenient regulatory deci-
sions, as happened in Argentina, for example, in the period of privatised 
water services in Buenos Aires (Lobina and Hall 2003).
Another form in which the role of the private sector is secured is 
through the creation by governments of special units, usually within 
finance ministries, to promote and manage PPPs. These units are domi-
nated by business interests:
In Egypt, for example, all PPP Unit members are from the private 
sector – this helps because the staff is already in a position to under-
stand private stakeholders’ concerns. Moreover, extensive training was 
undertaken with the help of in-house consultants and outside training. 
A key element is also to have a balanced staff composition, including 
legal advice, bankers, accountants, etc.. (IFC 2009b, 16)
A key function is the (re)education of civil servants:
A PPP Unit can help by providing a focal point for education and dis-
semination of knowledge, as well as driving the process. In India, for 
example, at the inception of the PPP Program, IDFC acted as a so-called 
‘secretariat of thoughts’ to bridge the thinking between the private sec-
tor and public sector, change the mindset of government officials and 
their understanding of the value the private sector brings to the table, 
and to align incentives. This process, like any fundamental change, 
takes time. (IFC 2009b, 15)
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There are now attempts to combine these global and national institutions 
into a wider international pressure group for PPPs. An international confer-
ence on PPPs in May 2009, involving the World Bank, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, UNECE, and various Asian governments, was presented with 
a lucidly expressed argument that the political conditions exist for an alter-
native based on a stronger role for the state (Hamilton 2009):
Discontent, even outright hostility, among the general public against the 
capitalist system has gained ground during the crisis. . . .  The “system” is 
mistrusted, and confidence in capitalism and its future is low...The crisis 
appears to have had its roots in the era of deregulation and is replaced by 
the growing role of the state in managing financial capitalism and exer-
cising accountability previously absent in the system;...PPPs are equated 
with the now discredited privatisation and financial liberalisation.
This was not presented by a critic of PPPs, but by an official of UNECE, 
an extremely anxious supporter of this form of privatisation. His conclu-
sion was that there was a need for “tools to bring back the banks and new 
institutions able to articulate a pro-PPP policy in the crisis (and those in the 
future)...a global advocate to spread support and the message around the 
globe: an alliance of PPP units”. Thus, the international financial institu-
tions and national finance ministries – all public sector institutions sus-
tained by public finance – would combine to act as a de facto international 
lobby group to protect PPPs and discourage a revival of direct state funding 
and provision of infrastructure. The objective is not, however, to cut or 
eliminate state expenditure. Hamilton (2009) also argued that the crisis 
brought opportunities for potential PPPs because of the economic, social, 
and environmental needs for public spending:
The potential demand for social infrastructure such as public light-
ing, hospitals, and schools, is amplified in volatile times when finan-
cial and economic crisis negatively affect low-income people’s life. The 
social infrastructure can not only serve as a safety net but also generate 
economic flow-on effects with increased human resource investment... 
There are ongoing needs to restore and replace much of the existing 
physical infrastructures, to accommodate population growth and to 
deal with the threats of global warming in response to the call for sus-
tainable development.
Similar rhetoric is present in other IFC documents. In a recent health care 
report, the IFC states that it aims to “help Africa address its health care 
challenges – including improving services to the poor”; that “the scale of 
the challenge has driven a reassessment of traditional approaches and a 
growing acceptance that the private sector should be a key part of the over-
all health strategy”. And so the IFC is creating a $400 million vehicle for 
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equity investment, “[i]mproving the environment for private health care” 
and “educating health workers through PPPs” (IFC-World Bank 2009). The 
solution to the health needs of Africans turns out to be placing hundreds of 
millions of public dollars at the disposal of private companies.
As a health strategy, it was rejected by Oxfam (2009, 1) in a compre-
hensive critique, which concluded that prioritising private sector delivery “is 
extremely unlikely to deliver health for poor people”. Yet, the IFC “estimates 
that private sector entities have the potential to deliver between 45 and 70 
percent of the needed increase in capacity” in the health sector, thereby rec-
ommending that governments needing the support of the private sector to 
fund the expected growth in health care demand must create an environment 
“supportive of significant private sector investment” (IFC 2009a, 15).
In addition, the role of private donor agencies in health, with the Gates 
Foundation at the fore, has become extremely important. They now pro-
vide levels of funding that are dominating official aid quantitatively and, to 
some extent, qualitatively. Not surprisingly, they are attuned towards non-
state, if not necessarily private, forms of provision, and their ethos is geared 
more towards private and clinically driven provision as opposed to public 
provision of primary and preventive health care and the broader conditions 
necessary for good health. As McCoy comments on Gates’s funding of the 
World Bank:
More controversial is the award of two grants to the International 
Finance Corporation, whose mandate is to support private sector 
development. The reasons why the International Finance Corporation 
needs philanthropic funding are not clear, but this donation suggests 
that the Gates Foundation is keen to promote the growth of private 
health-care providers in low-income and middle-income countries, and 
is consistent with views that have been expressed by the foundation 
and the observation that private foundations generally view the public 
sector with scepticism and disinterest. (McCoy 2009, 1651)
It is also noteworthy that the World Bank’s interventions into health have 
been at the expense of the World Health Organization, with “more than 
80 per cent of WHO’s funding...dependent on voluntary or so-called extra 
budgetary resources” (Koivusalo 2009, 159).
CONCLUSION
Where does this leave the promotion of alternative public sector provision 
into the future? Initially, we can draw two general lessons. First, there is a 
need to insulate public provision from financialization (the direct or indirect 
effects of turning provision into a financial asset however near or distant). 
Privatisation incorporates finance directly into services, with provision 
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becoming subject to the vagaries of stakeholder value on the stock market; 
subcontracting does it indirectly as the firms involved require their own 
financial imperatives to be observed. In short, finance needs to be placed 
in a subordinate not a dominant position. This is easier said than done not 
least because, prior to the crisis, this was said to be true of the financial sys-
tem in terms of its efficient mobilisation and allocation of funds for invest-
ment and its trading in risk. But financialization continues to impinge upon 
public provision in multifarious ways that can only be guarded against as 
opposed to being absolutely eliminated, at least for the foreseeable future.
Second, the vulnerability of public sector provision to erosion and dis-
tortion is a consequence of the absence of broader supportive institutions 
and policies in the wake of decades of neoliberalism. Alternative public sec-
tor provision and new, broader policy capacities, and corresponding means 
and sources of finance, must be built in tandem.
Beyond these two generalities, we would emphasise the need to address 
the specificity of particular types and circumstances of public sector provi-
sion in terms of the diversity of causes, content, and consequences to which 
they are subject, but without losing sight of the bigger picture. In particu-
lar, our own approach has been to posit the notion of public sector systems 
of provision (PSSOP). Specificity is incorporated by understanding each 
element of public provision as attached to an integral and distinctive system 
– the health system, the education system, and so on. Each PSSOP should 
be addressed by reference to the structures, agencies, processes, power, and 
conflicts that are exercised in material provision itself, taking full account 
of the whole chain of activity bringing together production, distribution 
(and access) and use, and the conditions under which these occur.
Thus, the PSSOP approach has the advantage of potentially incorporat-
ing each and every relevant element in the process of provision, investigat-
ing how they interact with one another, as well as situating them in relation 
to more general systemic functioning. This allows for an appropriate mix 
of the general and the specific and, policy-wise and strategically, signals 
where provision is obstructed, why, and how it might be remedied. This 
is in contrast to unduly focused approaches, those that emphasise mode of 
finance alone, for example, as has been the case for housing both before 
and after its current crisis (as opposed to emphasis on who is building what, 
how, and for whom, with what means of access). At the opposite extreme 
are unduly universal approaches such as those that appeal to market and/
or institutional imperfections, and which accordingly fail to recognise that 
water provision is very different from housing provision in and of itself as 
well as in different contexts.
The PSSOP approach has been addressed in Fine (2002) for the wel-
fare state, in Bayliss and Fine (2008) for electricity and water, and in Fine 
(2009a, 2009e) for social policy. We are not so much concerned here to 
develop, let alone impose, the PSSOP approach more fully as such, for it is 
essential to see it as an approach that needs to be contextually driven rather 
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than as a source of the ideal types or universal theory that characterises, 
and even mars, much of the current literature (leave things to the market, 
or correct market and institutional imperfections). Indeed, the purpose is 
rather to persuade of the need for something akin to the PSSOP approach 
irrespective of the method and theory with which it is deployed, which will, 
no doubt, continue to be controversial, alongside the nature, depth, and 
breadth of economic and social transformation essential for any significant 
change in provision to be secure. In other words, there is something dif-
ferent about water and housing, just as there is something different about 
South Africa and India.
Further, though, this does allow for the results of existing studies to be 
incorporated into the PSSOP approach to the extent that they do identify, 
however partially, the factors involved in provision and how they interact 
with one another. Of course, in practice, sectorally grounded approaches by 
electricity, health, and water appear to be adopted as if by second nature. But 
this has not necessarily been so of how they are analytically broached, where 
sectoral and contextual sensitivity often gives way to universal prescrip-
tion driven by the neoliberal fashion of the moment, whether privatisation, 
user charges, or public-private partnerships. At the very least, the PSSOP 
approach offers a framework with which to address policy needs in light of 
provision deficiencies, broadly interpreted, as opposed to general models and 
blunt recipes drawing to the fullest extent upon the “market” – i.e. private 
capital and finance – in practice even when recognising its deficiencies in 
principle.
In addition, as highlighted in earlier accounts of the approach, not only 
is each PSSOP uniquely and integrally organised in provision, by country 
and sector, each will also be attached to its own meaning and significance 
for those engaged with (or excluded by) it. For example, whether public 
provision is seen as household risk management against vulnerability or 
collective provision towards developmental goals is both cause and conse-
quence of material provision itself and, equally, subject to debate (or not 
insofar as different approaches exist in parallel with one another accord-
ing to context). As also argued in the approach, the cultural (in the widest 
sense) system attached to each PSSOP is also integral with material provi-
sion and is generated along and around that provision itself. Without going 
into details, the culture and meaning of public provision thereby becomes 
subject to what has been termed the 8Cs – Constructed, Contextual, Cha-
otic, Construed, Contradictory, Contested, Collective, and Closed (Fine 
2009c). This is important for developing and understanding the meanings 
attached to public provision, not least in prising them away from the nega-
tive stance attached to the neoliberal ideology of public provision.
One apparent weakness of the PSSOP approach, a consequence of its 
strength of examining provision comprehensively within sectors, is its 
distance, at least initially, from the synergies and interactions across sec-
tors, as with the role of “horizontal” factors (as opposed to the “vertical”) 
such as equity, labour conditions, and macroeconomic impacts. Arguably, 
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however, these need to be addressed in their own right and in the context of 
particular sectors within which they are rooted. Indeed, as revealed in the 
sectoral and regional studies offered elsewhere in this book, the dialogue 
between generic and sectoral issues is vital in designing, promoting, and 
defending public sector alternatives.
NOTES
 1. For the Bischoff and Darling (2009) and Wigley (2008) reports, respectively.
 2. As is sarcastically remarked by CRESC of Wigley: “Of the 71 witnesses, 
some 49 came directly from finance and a further 15 came from consul-
tancy activities which generally have revenue connections to finance. Quite 
remarkably, the public sector provided just one witness: presumably the 
knowledge and expertise of HM Treasury or Department of Business Enter-
prise Regulatory Reform were irrelevant to the story that Wigley told about 
the importance of defending this valuable activity” (2009, 25).
 3. In absolute terms, global financial assets rose from $12 to somewhere 
between $196 and $241 trillion from 1980 to 2007 (Blankenberg and Palma 
2009, 531).
 4. Financial Times. 2008. Why it is so hard to keep the financial sector caged. 
6 February.
 5. Asian Development Bank. www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Anticorruption/ 
anticorrupt300.asp?p=policies. 
 6. www.edfi.be. 
 7. Swedfund International AB. www.swedfund.se/en/investments-and-
new-markets /meet-the-entrepreneurs-who-have-already-invested /
health-care-in-ethiopia.
 8. UK Parliament Public Accounts Committe 2009. Eighteenth Report – Invest-
ing for Development: The Department for International Development’s over-
sight of CDC Group plc. 30 April 2009 HC 94 2008–09. www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubacc/94/9402.htm. 
 9. See OTPP (Ontario Teachers Pension Plan). www.docs.otpp.com/Infrastructure 
_2008_9B.pdf.
 10. Economist. 2008. Harvesting pensions. 27 November; Financial Times. 
2008. Argentina moves to nationalise pension funds. 21 November; Finan-
cial Times. 2009. Telecom Italia contests Argentina ruling. 13 April. 
 11. Financial Express. 2007. IFC to invest $5bn in India, to set up PPP advocacy 
unit, 15 March 2007. http://www.financialexpress.com/printer/news/194057/
 12. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). 2008. Statu-
tory Social and Environmental Guidance to the Water Services Regulation 
Authority (Ofwat). www.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/water/.../ofwat-
guidance080922.pdf.
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